The antitrust analysis of product hopping is nuanced. The conduct, which consists of a drug company’s reformulation of its product and encouragement of doctors to switch prescriptions to the reformulated product, sits at the intersection of antitrust law, patent law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and state substitution laws, and involves uniquely complicated markets with different buyers (insurance companies, patients) and decision-makers (physicians).

In Doryx, Namenda, and Coercion, Jack E. Pace III and Kevin C. Adam applaud some courts’ use of a product-hopping analysis that finds liability only where there is an element of coercion. In this response, Steve Shadowen and I explain that the unique characteristics of pharmaceutical markets render such a coercion-based approach misguided. We also show that excessively deferential analyses would give brand-name drug firms free rein to evade generic-promoting regulatory regimes. Finally, we offer a conservative framework for analyzing product hopping rooted in the economics and realities of the pharmaceutical industry.